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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., requires public accommodations, 
including movie theaters, to furnish auxiliary aids and services, 
which include qualified interpreters, to patrons with vision, 
hearing, and speech disabilities.  Plaintiff-Appellant Paul 
McGann, who is blind and deaf, requested from Defendant-
Appellee Cinemark USA, Inc. (“Cinemark”) an American Sign 
Language (“ASL”) tactile interpreter so that he could 
experience a movie in his local Cinemark theater during one of 
its regular showings.  Cinemark denied his request, and 
McGann then filed this suit under the ADA.   
 
 After a bench trial in which the parties stipulated to all 
relevant facts, the District Court entered Judgment in favor of 
Cinemark.  It reasoned that McGann’s requested tactile 
interpreter was not an auxiliary aid or service under the ADA 
and that the ADA did not require movie theaters to change the 
content of their services or offer “special” services for disabled 
patrons.  For the following reasons, we will vacate the 
Judgment and remand for consideration of Cinemark’s 
available defense.  
 
I. 
A. 
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 McGann has Usher’s Syndrome Type 1, a sensory 
disorder.  He was born deaf and began losing his sight at age 
five. He has been completely blind for approximately fifteen 
years, and he is now considered deaf-blind.  There is no single 
universally accepted method of communication for people who 
are deaf-blind.  McGann generally uses ASL to communicate 
with others.  ASL is a unique language that has its own idioms, 
grammar, and syntax.   
 
McGann can expressively communicate by signing in 
ASL himself.  He receptively communicates with the 
assistance of ASL tactile interpreters.   
There are numerous methods of ASL tactile interpretation.  
McGann most commonly uses the hand-over-hand method.  
The hand-over-hand method involves the recipient placing his 
hands lightly upon the hands of an interpreter, who is signing 
in ASL, and reading those ASL signs through touch and 
movement.   
 
 ASL tactile interpretation of a movie includes every 
possible element of that movie’s content, including visual, 
aural, and oral components.  In addition, because tactile 
interpretation in almost any venue includes a descriptive 
component, interpretation of a movie screening will include 
environmental elements, such as other viewers’ 
contemporaneous reactions.  Given practical limitations, tactile 
interpreters cannot communicate all elements of a movie 
verbatim; they must, at times, make judgment calls about what 
content to skip.  But tactile interpretation of a movie does not 
require any changes to the video or audio content of the movie, 
the auditorium screens or sound systems, or the physical 
environment—including the lighting—in or around the theater.   
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 McGann has experienced movies in theaters for many 
years.  He enjoys attending movies in person for a number of 
reasons; among others, it affords him the opportunity to 
participate in discussions about the movies with his friends and 
family.  Before his wife passed away in 2001, she would 
provide him with tactile interpretation during movies in the 
theater.  Since then, McGann has attended movies at a local 
Carmike Cinema.  Carmike provided him with tactile 
interpretation services for movie presentations at his request.   
 
 In November 2014, McGann became interested in 
experiencing the movie Gone Girl (Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp. 2014), after hearing about it from his family and 
reading about it online using Braille.  After he contacted his 
customary Carmike Cinema to inquire about attending a 
presentation of the movie, he learned it was no longer playing 
there.  So he sought another theater in which to experience it.   
 
 Cinemark owned another theater in McGann’s local 
area, Cinemark Robinson Township and XD Theater 
(“Cinemark Robinson”).  As of December 2014, Cinemark was 
the most geographically diverse, worldwide exhibitor of 
movies, with 335 theaters and 4,499 movie screens in the 
United States, spread across forty-one states, including 
Pennsylvania.  Cinemark makes assistive listening devices, 
closed captioning devices, and descriptive narration devices 
available in its U.S. theaters to patrons who are disabled.  But 
given McGann’s disability, none of those devices would help 
him experience a movie.  
 
 Having learned that Cinemark Robinson still offered 
Gone Girl, McGann e-mailed the theater directly to request 
tactile interpretation services that would allow him to 
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experience the movie during one of its regular presentations.  
After receiving no response to his initial inquiry, McGann 
contacted Cinemark Robinson again and was directed to senior 
paralegal Leslie Petengill, who worked in Cinemark’s national 
headquarters in Texas.  He reached out to Petengill that same 
day.  
   
 Cinemark had never received a request for tactile 
interpretation services for a patron who was deaf-blind before 
McGann’s request.  Petengill and Cinemark investigated 
McGann’s request by contacting the Center for Hearing and 
Deaf Services (“HDS”), which provided Cinemark with quotes 
for tactile interpretation services.  Rates ranged between $50 
and $65 per hour, for a minimum of two hours.  Because HDS 
considered tactile interpretation of Gone Girl a complex 
assignment, with a duration of over two hours, it would have 
required two interpreters.  
  
 Petengill denied McGann’s request for tactile 
interpretation services on December 15, 2014, via e-mail, on 
her own authority.  The e-mail explained that Cinemark did not 
believe that the ADA required Cinemark to provide McGann 
with tactile interpretation services for the purpose of 
“describ[ing] the movie [McGann] [would] [be] attending.”  
As of January 2016, Cinemark had not received any other 
requests to provide tactile interpretation services to any patron 
who is deaf-blind. 
   
McGann filed suit against Cinemark in March 2015, 
alleging that the theater violated Title III of the ADA when it 
denied his request for tactile interpreting services.  In his suit, 
he sought declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs.  After 
discovery, the parties did not file dispositive motions.  They 
7 
 
agreed to a non-jury trial before the District Court presented 
through pretrial briefs, amended joint stipulations of fact, joint 
exhibits, and oral argument.  Oral argument was held in 
January 2016.  The District Court entered Judgment for 
Cinemark in April 2016.  This timely appeal followed.1  
  
B. 
 With an understanding of the factual and procedural 
background of McGann’s claim, we turn to the statutory and 
regulatory framework under which his claim arises.  Congress 
enacted the ADA in 1990 as a “clear and comprehensive 
national mandate” designed to eliminate discrimination against 
individuals with physical and mental disabilities across the 
United States.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1), 12101(b)(1); PGA 
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674-75 (2001).  To help 
“effectuate its sweeping purpose,” Congress enacted Title III 
of the ADA, which prohibits “public accommodations” from 
discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability.  
PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 675; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).  “Public 
accommodations” span “12 extensive categories” and include 
“a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other 
place of exhibition or entertainment.”  PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 
676, 676 n.24 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)).   
 
 Title III begins with a “[g]eneral rule” that “[n]o 
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
                                              
 1 The Civil Rights Division of the United States 
Department of Justice has submitted an amicus brief in support 
of McGann and urges us to reverse the District Court 
Judgment. 
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disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
of any place of public accommodation.”  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).  
“The term ‘discrimination’ is not directly and uniformly 
defined in Title III.”  Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l. Med. 
Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1998).  “Instead, the statute 
provides several ‘general prohibitions,’” which bar broad 
categories of conduct “that constitute discrimination for 
purposes of the general rule found in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).”  
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)).  These general 
prohibitions include, inter alia, denying an individual on the 
basis of a disability “the opportunity . . . to participate in or 
benefit from the goods [or] services” of a public 
accommodation.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 
 Congress supplemented the general prohibitions against 
discrimination in Title III with several “specific prohibitions,” 
which also constitute discrimination “for purposes of the 
general rule announced in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).”  Menkowitz, 
154 F.3d at 117 (citing § 12182(b)(2)(i)-(iv)); see also Spector 
v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 128 (2005).  One 
such “special prohibition,” see 42 U.S.C. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), pertains to “auxiliary aids and services.” 2  
Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) requires public accommodations 
to “take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, 
segregated or otherwise treated differently than other 
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and 
                                              
 2 We refer to this “special prohibition” throughout this 
Opinion as the “auxiliary aids and services requirement” of 
Title III. 
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services.”  Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).  Failure 
to take such steps amounts to prohibited discrimination unless 
the accommodation shows that providing the auxiliary aid or 
service would “fundamentally alter the nature of the good, 
service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being 
offered” or “would result in an undue burden.”  Id. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).   
 
 In addition to the text of the statute itself, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued a specific regulation 
implementing Title III’s auxiliary aid and service 
requirement.3  This regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.303, begins with 
a general rule, virtually identical to the auxiliary aid and 
service provision of Title III: “A public accommodation shall 
take those steps that may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, 
segregated or otherwise treated differently than other 
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and 
services,” subject to the fundamental alteration and undue 
burden exceptions.  Id. § 36.303(a) (emphasis added).  The 
regulation also includes an effective communication 
                                              
 3 The ADA directed the Attorney General to “issue 
regulations . . . to carry out the provisions” of Title III, 42 
U.S.C. § 12186(b), and to provide “appropriate technical 
assistance manuals to individuals or entities with rights or 
duties” under Title III.  Id. § 12206(c)(3).  In accordance with 
this directive, the DOJ published its original set of regulations 
pertaining to Title III in 1991.  In September 2010, it published 
revised regulations addressing, inter alia, the auxiliary aid 
requirement of Title III.  See generally 28 C.F.R. § 36.101, et 
seq.   
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requirement, stating that public accommodations must “furnish 
appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to 
ensure effective communication with individuals with 
disabilities.”  Id. § 36.303(c)(1).  DOJ regulatory guidance 
notes that the duty to provide effective communication with 
customers is “implicit” in the duty of a public accommodation 
to provide auxiliary aids and services.  Id. Pt. 36, App. A.   
 
 The ADA supplies a definition for “auxiliary aids and 
services.”  The term includes, in relevant part: (1) “qualified 
interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally 
delivered materials available to individuals with hearing 
impairments”; (2) “qualified readers, taped texts, or other 
effective methods of making visually delivered materials 
available to individuals with visual impairments”; and (3) 
“other similar services and actions.”  42 U.S.C. § 12103(1)(A)-
(B), (D).  DOJ implementing regulations offer a non-
exhaustive list of auxiliary aids and services that may be 
required to “ensure effective communication with individuals 
with disabilities.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b), (c)(1); see also Id. 
Pt. 36, App. A (explaining that the list of auxiliary aids 
provided in Section 36.303 is non-exhaustive).  This list 
includes “[q]ualified interpreters on-site.”   Id. § 36.303(b)(1).  
DOJ regulatory guidance on auxiliary aids and services notes 
that “if a deaf and blind individual needs interpreting services, 
an interpreter who is qualified to handle the interpreting needs 
of that individual may be required.”  Id. Pt. 36, App. A.  
  
 The DOJ also issued a Technical Assistance Publication 
in 2014 that provided guidance on communicating effectively 
with individuals who have vision, hearing, or speech 
disabilities.  See Dep’t of Justice, ADA Requirements: Effective 
Communication (Jan. 31, 2014), 
11 
 
http://www.ada.gov/effective-comm.htm.  This publication 
specifically mentions tactile interpreters as auxiliary aids or 
services that may be used to communicate with individuals 
who are deaf-blind.  Id.   
 
 DOJ regulations caution that public accommodations 
cannot expect a one-size-fits-all approach to satisfy their 
obligations under the ADA.  “The type of auxiliary aid or 
service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary 
in accordance with the method of communication used by the 
individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the 
communication involved; and the context in which the 
communication is taking place.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c)(ii).   
 
 Consistent with the text of Title III, the regulations 
provide that a public accommodation may avoid ADA liability 
for failure to provide an auxiliary aid or service only if it shows 
that the aid or service in question “fundamentally alter[s] the 
nature” of its goods or services, or “would result in an undue 
burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.”  Id. § 36.303(a).  
The regulations also specify that a public accommodation is 
not required to “alter its inventory to include accessible or 
special goods,” such as “Brailled versions of books,” audio 
books, or other items “that are designed for, or facilitate use 
by, individuals with disabilities.”  Id. § 36.307. 
 
 This appeal centers on the meaning of Title III’s 
auxiliary aids and services requirement.  With an 
understanding of the statutory and regulatory context 
surrounding that requirement, we turn to the merits of 
McGann’s claim. 
 
II. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction over this suit 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In the context of a bench trial, 
we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
conclusions of law and review findings of fact for clear error.  
VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282-
83 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
III. 
 There is no dispute that McGann is disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA.  There is also no dispute that Cinemark 
is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA.  The 
issue we must resolve in this appeal is whether Cinemark’s 
failure to provide McGann with a tactile interpreter,4 so that he 
could experience the film Gone Girl in one of its theaters, 
constitutes a Title III “special prohibition” regarding auxiliary 
aids and services and thus violates Title III’s “general rule” that 
no individual shall be denied the “full and equal enjoyment of 
the goods [and] services” of “a place of public 
accommodation.”  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).  The District Court 
found that Title III did not obligate Cinemark to honor 
McGann’s request because (a) his requested tactile interpreter 
                                              
 4 As discussed in Section I, two tactile interpreters 
would be necessary for McGann to experience Gone Girl.  We 
refer to “interpreter” in the singular here for the sake of 
simplicity, because the number of interpreters requested has no 
bearing on whether Title III entitles McGann to this type of 
auxiliary aid or service under the ADA.  It may, however, bear 
on whether providing this service imposes an undue burden on 
Cinemark, which we discuss infra.   
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was not an “auxiliary aid or service” that satisfied the statutory 
definition, and (b) McGann was not excluded from or denied 
Cinemark’s services by the theater’s denying him a tactile 
interpreter to experience the movie.   
 
A. 
 We begin by considering whether, in the context of this 
case, McGann’s requested ASL tactile interpreter is an 
“auxiliary aid or service.”  As detailed above, the ADA defines 
the term to include (1) “qualified interpreters or other effective 
methods of making aurally delivered materials available to 
individuals with hearing impairments”; (2) “qualified readers, 
taped texts, or other effective methods of making visually 
delivered materials available to individuals with visual 
impairments”; and (3) “other similar services and actions.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12103(1)(A)-(B), (D).  DOJ regulations include 
“qualified interpreters” among examples of auxiliary aids and 
services, 28 C.F.R. § 36.303, and DOJ technical assistance 
materials specifically mention tactile interpreters as auxiliary 
aids or services, Dep’t of Justice, ADA Requirements: Effective 
Communication (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.ada.gov/effective-comm.htm.   
 
 Cinemark did not dispute that the ASL tactile interpreter 
requested by McGann was a “qualified interpreter.”  Nor did it 
dispute that the tactile interpretation provided by this 
“qualified interpreter” would “make aurally delivered 
material[]” and “visually delivered material[]” available to 
McGann, who has both hearing and visual impairments.  42 
U.S.C. § 12103(1)(A)-(B).  Therefore, McGann’s requested 
ASL tactile interpreter “fall[s] comfortably within the scope of 
th[e] definition” of “auxiliary aids and services” provided in 
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the text of the ADA and DOJ regulations.  Arizona ex rel. 
Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enter., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 674 
(9th Cir. 2010).  The DOJ, participating in this appeal as 
amicus curiae in support of McGann, agrees.  See DOJ Amicus 
Br. 14, 24 (stating that “[a]n ASL tactile interpreter falls within 
the [ADA]’s and the regulation’s definitions of ‘auxiliary aids 
and services’”).   
 
 Despite the District Court’s acknowledgement that 
“‘qualified interpreters’ are specifically listed in the ADA and 
the Federal Regulations as an example of an auxiliary aid,” 
App. 16, it found that McGann’s requested tactile interpreter 
did not meet the definition of “auxiliary aids and services.”  
The District Court explained that the word “auxiliary,” as 
defined in the dictionary, connotes something that has a 
“supplemental” relationship to something else, not something 
that is “altogether new or different.”  App. 16 (citing Webster’s 
Third New Dictionary, Unabridged, s.v. “auxiliary,” 
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com).  Relying on this 
definition, it reasoned that since the service that Cinemark 
provides—presenting movies—did not already include tactile 
interpretation, tactile interpretation would be a new, not 
supplementary, service and was therefore not an “auxiliary” 
service under 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1) and 28 C.F.R. § 36.303.   
 
 There are several problems with how the District Court 
interpreted “auxiliary aids and services” in this case.  Most 
broadly, applying the District Court’s definition would render 
the auxiliary aids and services requirement of Title III 
meaningless.  All of the products, technologies, and services 
explicitly listed in the statute and regulations as examples of 
auxiliary aids and services would constitute “new” goods or 
services escaping Title III’s mandate unless they were already 
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provided by a public accommodation voluntarily.  In effect, no 
public accommodation would need to provide them in the first 
place.  We decline to interpret Title III and the DOJ regulations 
in such a manner.  See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough 
Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that 
courts should “interpret statutes to give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word” rather than render some of them 
meaningless); see also United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (cautioning courts against 
construing statutes in a way that would produce “absurd” 
results).    
 
Second, the District Court need not have resorted to 
dictionary definitions of the word “auxiliary” to understand the 
meaning of “auxiliary aids and services” in Title III, since the 
statute and DOJ regulations specifically define the term.  
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a 
statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that 
definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary 
meaning.”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1987) (“It 
is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes 
unstated meanings of that term.”).  The statute contains no 
ambiguity as to whether a qualified interpreter fell within those 
definitions; it was specifically listed as an example of an 
“auxiliary aid or service.”   
 
Third, even if there had been a reason to consult a 
dictionary, the District Court overlooked another definition 
provided for “auxiliary.”  The primary dictionary definition 
provided for the term “auxiliary” in the very same dictionary 
cited by the District Court is “offering or providing help, 
assistance, or support.”  Webster’s Third New Dictionary, 
Unabridged, s.v. “auxiliary,” http://unabridged.merriam-
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webster.com; see also Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 
“auxiliary,” http://www.oed.com (offering as the primary 
definition for “auxiliary”: “helpful, assistant, affording aid, 
rendering assistance, giving support or succor”).  The 
relevance of this primary definition—“offering help”—in this 
context is self-evident.  The relevance of a secondary 
definition—“supplementary” —is not. 
 
Finally, if we were to embrace the “supplementary” 
definition of “auxiliary,” McGann’s requested tactile 
interpreter would still satisfy this definition.  As the Ninth 
Circuit pointed out in Harkins, “movie theaters’ primary 
service is to screen films.”  603 F.3d at 674.  Providing tactile 
interpretation of a film being presented in a movie theater is 
“not so removed from a theater’s usual business that [it] cannot 
be deemed [a] ‘subsidiary’ or ‘supplemental’” service.  Id.   
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the tactile 
interpreter McGann requested is an “auxiliary aid or service” 
that satisfies Title III. 
 
B. 
 Having determined that a tactile interpreter meets the 
definition of “auxiliary aid or service” laid out in the ADA and 
DOJ implementing regulations, we consider whether 
Cinemark’s failure to provide tactile interpretation of the 
movie Gone Girl excluded McGann from or denied him 
Cinemark’s services.  The District Court found that it did not.  
We disagree. 
 
 In finding in favor of Cinemark, the District Court 
adopted Cinemark’s argument that “Title III only ensures that 
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people with disabilities are not denied access to places of 
public accommodation” and the services offered at those 
places, but it does not “require a . . . public accommodation to 
provide . . . goods and services specially designed for disabled 
persons.”  App. 10.  Since Cinemark did not provide tactile 
interpretation services for its movies in its normal course of 
business, the District Court reasoned, tactile interpretation was 
a “special” service not required under the law.  This “special 
goods and services” rule may have a foundation in Circuit 
precedent and DOJ regulations, but those authorities do not 
support the District Court’s extension of the rule to the 
auxiliary aids and services requirement. 
 
 The District Court distilled the “special goods and 
services” rule primarily from a line of circuit authority in which 
disabled individuals claimed that Title III required insurance 
companies to alter or modify their insurance policy products in 
some way.  For instance, in McNeil v. Time Insurance 
Company, the plaintiff had purchased a health insurance policy 
that capped AIDS-related benefits.  205 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 
2000).  Not long after acquiring the policy, the plaintiff was 
diagnosed with AIDS and incurred related medical bills that 
exceeded the policy’s cap.  Id.  The plaintiff filed suit, claiming 
that the insurer’s failure to cover his excess medical expenses 
constituted prohibited discrimination under Title III of the 
ADA.  Id. at 182-83.   
 
 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of 
the plaintiff’s Title III claim, holding that Title III did not reach 
the terms of the policies sold by the insurer since “a business 
is not required to alter or modify the goods or services it offers 
to satisfy Title III.”  Id. at 186.  The Court explained that “[t]he 
provisions in §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) concerning the 
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opportunity to benefit from or to participate in a good or 
service”—Title III’s “general prohibitions”—“do not imply 
that the goods or services must be modified to ensure that 
opportunity or benefit.  Rather, this section only refers to 
impediments that stand in the way of a person’s ability to enjoy 
that good or service in the form that the establishment normally 
provides it.”  Id. at 186 n.9. 
   
 Numerous other Circuits, including ours, have applied 
this reasoning in similar insurance benefits cases.5  Several of 
these cases cited to the DOJ regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a), 
which provides the same general rule: a public accommodation 
is not required to “alter its inventory to include accessible or 
special goods that are designed for, or facilitate use by, 
                                              
 5 See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 
F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an insurer could 
not be held liable under Title III of the ADA for limiting mental 
illness benefits because the ADA did not require the provision 
of different goods and services); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an 
insurance company was not required to offer a different 
insurance policy to individuals with AIDS than it offered to 
other individuals, because the ADA “d[id] not regulate the 
content of insurance policies”); Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., 
Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
defendant’s health coverage policy did not violate the ADA by 
excluding coverage for certain types of transplant procedures 
that affect particular categories of disabled individuals); Ford 
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that “an insurance office . . . need not provide 
insurance that treats the disabled equally with the non-
disabled”).   
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individuals with disabilities,” such as “Brailled versions of 
books.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a); see also Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.  
 
 The District Court extended the reasoning of this line of 
authority to the auxiliary aids and services requirement, finding 
that because Cinemark does not normally offer tactile 
interpretation of movies for any of its patrons during regular 
screenings, tactile interpretation would be a “special” service 
that is not required under these cases.  The District Court’s 
conclusion, in the context of the statutory scheme, meant that 
the “special goods and services” rule served as a limitation on 
Title III’s mandate that public accommodations provide 
auxiliary aids and services.   
 
 Critically, however, none of the cases in the McNeil, 
Doe and Weyer line of authority turned on—or even touched 
on—the auxiliary aids and services requirement.  So even if 
this line of authority were to stand for the general proposition 
that public accommodations do not have to provide different 
products or services for their patrons with disabilities, those 
cases say nothing about how the auxiliary aid and service 
requirement relates to this general proposition.  Those circuits 
had no reason to consider the question.  Likewise, 28 C.F.R. § 
36.307(a) does not address the auxiliary aids and services 
requirement.  
 
 The Ninth Circuit, in Harkins, did have occasion to 
examine the relationship between the “special goods and 
services” rule and the auxiliary aids and services requirement.  
The Harkins plaintiffs challenged under Title III the 
defendant’s failure to provide closed captioning and 
descriptive narration to individuals with disabilities who 
sought to screen films in its movie theaters.  603 F.3d at 668-
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69.  The district court, relying on McNeil and Weyer, had 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the ADA did not 
require movie theaters to alter the content of the services 
provided.  Id. at 670-71.  
 
 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that closed 
captioning and descriptive narration constituted “auxiliary aids 
and services” under the statute, which a movie theater must 
provide to patrons with disabilities under the ADA, subject to 
available defenses.  Id. at 675.  In doing so, the Court rejected 
the defendant’s and the district court’s extension of the 
reasoning in Weyer to limit the auxiliary aid and service 
requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).   The Court 
explained: 
 
In arguing that the ADA’s 
requirement of auxiliary aids and 
services is limited by Weyer, 
[Defendant] puts the cart before 
the horse: Weyer does not limit 
subsection 42 U.S.C. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)’s requirement 
that a public accommodation 
provide auxiliary aids and 
services; the requirement that 
establishments provide auxiliary 
aids and services limits Weyer’s 
general rule that public 
accommodations do not have to 
provide different services for the 
disabled. Although Weyer may be 
controlling in the provision of 
goods and services generally, here 
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Plaintiffs are seeking an auxiliary 
aid, which is specifically mandated 
by the ADA to prevent 
discrimination of the disabled. 
 
Harkins, 603 F.3d at 671-72.  We agree. 
 
 For the reasons pointed out in Harkins and already 
discussed here, the auxiliary aids and services requirement 
would be “effectively eliminate[d]” if limited by the “special 
goods and services” rule.  Id. at 672.  Unless already provided 
voluntarily, auxiliary aids and services would never be 
required, because “[b]y its very definition, an auxiliary aid or 
service is an additional or different service that establishments 
must offer the disabled.”  Id. at 672 (emphasis added).  We, 
like the Ninth Circuit, reject this interpretation of Title III.  See 
Starbucks Corp., 736 F.3d at 209; Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 
U.S. at 543. 
 
 At a more fundamental level, the District Court’s 
analogy to these insurance policy cases failed to account for 
the context-specific nature of the auxiliary aids and services 
requirement.  Insurance companies and retail stores, such as 
bookstores, generally offer goods and services that are 
different in type and in character from those offered by 
entertainment venues like movie theaters.  What constitutes a 
denial of or exclusion from those goods or services will differ 
accordingly.  Therefore, a court cannot simply assume that 
what satisfies Title III’s auxiliary aids and services 
requirement in one context will necessarily satisfy it in another.  
Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (noting that the auxiliary aid or 
service required will vary according to the context in which a 
communication takes place). 
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A bookstore offers customers the ability to select and 
purchase books from the store’s shelves and inventory.  Our 
case law and 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a) instruct that a bookstore 
may not need to offer Brailled versions of books, if doing so 
would require altering the mix of goods provided.  See 28 
C.F.R. § 36.307(a); Ford, 145 F.3d at 613.  But we would have 
little trouble concluding that a bookstore had denied service to 
a customer if that customer was forbidden from perusing the 
store’s existing selection or purchasing whatever book he or 
she chose.  So, as the District Court’s opinion implied and 
Cinemark does not dispute, the bookstore may need to provide 
an auxiliary aid or service to assist a customer who is blind 
with selecting and purchasing a book, so that he or she is not 
excluded from or denied the goods already offered by the 
bookstore, in violation of Title III.  
 
Likewise, insurance companies offer customers a 
number of standardized insurance contracts available for 
purchase.  An insurance company—that otherwise meets the 
definition of “public accommodation”—may not need to offer 
an insurance product tailored to disabled individuals, under 
McNeil, Doe, and similar cases.  But it may need to provide an 
auxiliary aid and service that will communicate the contents of 
a written policy to a customer who is blind so that he or she can 
make an informed purchase.   
 
The District Court seemed to assume, based on this line 
of authority, that a public accommodation’s obligation to 
provide auxiliary aids and services does not extend beyond a 
patron or customer’s selection of and payment for the good or 
service of interest.  So as it pivoted in its opinion from 
bookstores and insurance companies to the entertainment 
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context, the District Court stated as a legal premise that Title 
III does not require art galleries to provide verbal descriptions 
of paintings, or concert halls to provide descriptions of the 
music being played.  Instead, the District Court explained, Title 
III simply requires that paintings and performances on display 
“are accessible” to patrons with disabilities.  App. 15.  In other 
words, auxiliary aids and services are required only until a 
disabled patron has purchased a ticket and is situated in a place 
where he or she could perceive the entertainment, but for his 
or her hearing or vision disability.  The District Court cited to 
no authority to support this specific legal premise, and 
Cinemark does not provide any on appeal, despite reiterating 
the same premise in its briefing.   
 
 As the DOJ pointed out in its amicus brief, it has 
regularly taken the position in litigating and enforcing the 
ADA that entertainment venues must provide auxiliary aids 
and services to make the content of their performances 
accessible to persons with vision and hearing impairments.  
Consistent with this position, the DOJ amended 28 C.F.R. § 
36.303, after oral argument in this case, to require movie 
theaters, under their existing Title III obligations, to provide 
closed captioning and audio description for digital movies 
presented in those theaters’ auditoriums.6  28 C.F.R. § 
                                              
 6 These amendments to 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 impose 
specific and detailed requirements only on movie theaters 
presenting digital movies that are produced or distributed with 
closed captioning or audio description features; almost all new 
digital movie releases are distributed with such features.  28 
C.F.R. § 36.303; 81 Fed. Reg. 87,348-01.  Nevertheless, the 
supplementary information included with the DOJ’s final rule 
repeatedly emphasizes that the rule does not change all movie 
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36.303(g)(2); see also Nondiscrimination of the Basis of 
Disability by Public Accommodations – Movie Theaters; 
Movie Captioning and Audio Description, 81 Fed. Reg. 
87,348-01 (2016) (final rule) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36).  To 
the extent that the District Court relied on this legal premise to 
conclude that Title III did not obligate Cinemark to provide 
auxiliary aids and services during the movie presentation itself, 
that reliance was misguided.  
 
 Entertainment venues, such as concert halls and movie 
theaters, offer to the public something different than stores 
offering goods or products for purchase.  They offer an 
entertainment service.  As Cinemark acknowledged, customers 
do not pay these entertainment venues for tickets to sit in an 
empty auditorium.  They pay to experience the entertainment 
being offered.  App. 49 (“According to . . . Petengill, people 
‘come to the theatre to watch a movie, not just sit in a seat.’”); 
see also Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 17, 24 
(D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting the same “special goods and services” 
argument advanced by defendant movie theaters and 
highlighting that the defendants had “fail[ed] to recognize that 
they are not similarly-situated to bookstores and video stores 
that provide goods because [they] provide the service of 
screening first run movies”).  The provision of this 
entertainment service continues after a patron selects a movie 
of interest, purchases a ticket to that movie, and walks into the 
auditorium.  So, too, does the obligation to provide auxiliary 
aids and services. 
 
                                              
theaters’ “longstanding” obligation “to provide effective 
communication to persons with disabilities through the use of 
auxiliary aids and services.”  81 Fed. Reg. 87,348-01. 
25 
 
 The District Court’s interpretation of movie theaters’ 
obligations under the auxiliary aids and services requirement 
is also inimical to the purposes of Title III, as reflected 
explicitly in the ADA itself, as well as in the legislative history 
of the statute.  Among those problems Congress sought to 
address by enacting the ADA was the “serious and pervasive 
social problem” of “discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities” by “isolat[ing] and segregat[ing]” them in 
American society.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).  Congress stated 
in the text of the ADA that this isolation and segregation of 
individuals with disabilities persisted “in such critical areas as 
. . . public accommodations . . . [and] recreation.”  Id. § 
12101(a)(3).   
 
 Indeed, data and testimony collected by Congress as it 
developed the ADA “painted a sobering picture of an isolated 
and secluded population of individuals with disabilities” who 
“d[id] not frequent places of public accommodation.”  S. Rep. 
No. 101-116, at 10-11 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 
34-35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316.  Due to 
communication barriers, among other reasons, the “large 
majority of people with disabilities d[id] not go to movies, 
d[id] not go to the theater, d[id] not go to see musical 
performances, and d[id] not go to sports events.”  S. Rep. No. 
101-116, at 10-11; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 34-35.  “The 
extent of non-participation . . . in social and recreational 
activities [was] alarming.”  S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 10-11; H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-485 at 34-35.  So, after its thorough and fact-
intensive investigation, “Congress concluded that there was a 
‘compelling need’ . . . to integrate [individuals with 
disabilities] ‘into the economic and social mainstream of 
American life.’”  PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 675 (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 101-116; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
26 
 
12101(a)(7) (among the “Nation’s proper goals” are “equality 
of opportunity” for and “full participation” in American life by 
individuals with disabilities). 
 
 This legislative history reflects Congress’ recognition 
that presenting movies in the theater is a component of the 
“social mainstream of American life.”  PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 
675 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485).  
Indeed, our Supreme Court has commented on the importance 
of movies in American culture: 
 
It cannot be doubted that motion 
pictures are a significant medium 
for the communication of ideas. 
They may affect public attitudes 
and behavior in a variety of ways, 
ranging from direct espousal of a 
political or social doctrine to the 
subtle shaping of thought which 
characterizes all artistic 
expression.  The importance of 
motion pictures as an organ of 
public opinion is not lessened by 
the fact that they are designed to 
entertain as well as to inform.   
 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).  If 
we interpret the auxiliary aids and services requirement to 
facilitate only the process of directing an individual with 
hearing or vision impairments to the right auditorium, which 
is showing a movie they cannot hear or see (or both), the 
requirement does little, if anything, to remediate the very 
problem Congress designed it to address.   
27 
 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that Cinemark’s failure 
to provide McGann with a tactile interpreter for a presentation 
of the movie Gone Girl excluded him from or denied him 
Cinemark’s services. 
 
C. 
 Having established that Title III’s auxiliary aids and 
service requirement applies to McGann’s request for a tactile 
interpreter to allow him to experience a movie in Cinemark’s 
theater, we turn to Cinemark’s available defenses.  As 
discussed, Title III does not obligate a public accommodation 
to furnish a requested auxiliary aid or service if doing so would 
“fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, 
privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered” or 
“would result in an undue burden.”  42 U.S.C. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).  The public accommodation bears the 
burden of showing either defense.  Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 36.303. 
 
 Cinemark has asserted in this litigation its fundamental 
alteration defense.  In its answer to McGann’s complaint, it 
stated that providing McGann with his requested interpreter 
“would result in a fundamental alteration of the goods and 
services provided by Cinemark, as Cinemark does not provide 
sign language or tactile interpreters for any of its exhibitions in 
the normal course of business.”   App. 46.  In its briefing to this 
Court, Cinemark describes its defense as “consistent with the 
‘accessible and special goods’ rule articulated in 28 C.F.R. § 
36.307.”  Appellee’s Br. 49.  For the reasons already discussed, 
this argument fails.   
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 Moreover, Cinemark does not dispute that tactile 
interpretation of a movie does not require any changes to the 
video or audio content of the movie, the screens or sound 
systems that present the movie, or the physical environment—
including the lighting—in or around the theater.  We thus do 
not see how it constitutes “a modification that is so significant 
that it alters the essential nature of the . . . services,” see Dep’t 
of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual 
Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, 
at III-4.3600 (1993), that Cinemark provides, or alters the 
“fundamental character” of those services,” see PGA Tour, 532 
U.S. at 683.  As the DOJ points out, “[f]or every patron in the 
theater who does not have a sensory disability and does not 
request an auxiliary aid, the ‘fundamental character’ of the 
movie remains unchanged.”  DOJ Amicus Br. 31.   
 
2 
 Cinemark also asserted an undue burden defense.  
However, the District Court did not reach it, as it entered 
Judgment in favor of Cinemark on other grounds.  DOJ 
regulations instruct that “undue burden” under Title III “means 
significant difficulty or expense.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.104.  The 
regulations also provide a lengthy list of factors for courts and 
public accommodations to consider when evaluating whether 
taking a particular action, such as providing a requested 
auxiliary aid or service, would result in an undue burden.  
These factors include:  
 
(1) The nature and cost of the 
action needed under this part; 
(2) The overall financial resources 
of the site or sites involved in the 
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action; the number of persons 
employed at the site; the effect on 
expenses and resources; legitimate 
safety requirements that are 
necessary for safe operation, 
including crime prevention 
measures; or the impact otherwise 
of the action upon the operation of 
the site; 
(3) The geographic separateness, 
and the administrative or fiscal 
relationship of the site or sites in 
question to any parent corporation 
or entity; 
(4) If applicable, the overall 
financial resources of any parent 
corporation or entity; the overall 
size of the parent corporation or 
entity with respect to the number 
of its employees; the number, type, 
and location of its facilities; and 
(5) If applicable, the type of 
operation or operations of any 
parent corporation or entity, 
including the composition, 
structure, and functions of the 
workforce of the parent 
corporation or entity. 
 
Id.  Given the fact-intensive nature of the undue burden 
inquiry, we will remand this portion of the District Court’s 
judgment for the District Court to undertake the inquiry in the 
first instance. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s entry of Judgment for the Defendant and remand the 
case for consideration of Cinemark’s undue burden defense.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
